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ABSTRACT
In his influential book, Straight Talk on Trade, Dani Rodrik provides a cogent critique
of the existing international economic order and concludes as follows: ‘So, I accept
that nation-states are a source of disintegration for the global economy.’ This article
critically engages with the idea that the nation-state is a legitimate force of disintegration
of the international economic order, with particular attention to trade and investment
agreements. In times of raising authoritarianism, it is crucial to reflect on some of the limits
of the nation-state and on the necessity to develop alternative paradigms for integrating
economies and societies. Against this background, this article posits that we should
beware of the risk of a ‘Schmittean moment’. This term is used to refer to a major shift
toward an ideal of unfettered national sovereignty as the chief paradigm to re-orient the
international (economic) order. Under such ideal, any international normative bench-
mark is brushed away by an allegedly more intellectually honest ‘political’ dimension,
which can find its realization only in the decisionist state. To understand the risk of a
‘Schmittean moment’ it is important to recognize that the move toward more nation-state
is partly animated by some legitimate concerns over the existing international legal order,
such as those underpinning the analysis by Dani Rodrik. This article articulates a two-
fold critique of the idea that an expansion of national sovereignty is going to achieve a
better socio-economic world order per se. The first critique is internal, showing that the
nation-state does not possess intrinsic characteristics to facilitate democracy, equality, and
sustainability. The second is external and focuses on the necessity to look reflexively at the
goals of the system of international economic law, to re-imagine it as capable to address
questions of inequality and environmental degradation.
INTRODUCTION
There was a time when national sovereignty was out of fashion. In the nineties, inter-
national lawyers were engaged in imaging the global order beyond the nation-state.
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Theories to make this order possible were proliferating: from Global Administrative
Law to global constitutionalism.1 International Economic Law (IEL) played an impor-
tant role in the journey toward the global order. Our markets could be integrated
through an almost brand new organization, the World Trade Organization (WTO). The
WTO was created and endowed with a powerful set of new agreements, promoting
the harmonization of health and safety law—through the Sanitary and Phytosani-
tary (SPS) Agreement—and technical regulation—Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)
Agreement—and establishing (relatively uniform) Intellectual Property Rights regimes
worldwide (the TRIPS Agreement). The WTO also included a brand new dispute
settlement system, considered by many as a manifestation of the rule of law at the inter-
national level. Similarly, organizations such as the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) were indirectly spreading (de-)regulatory policies throughout
the developing world.2 Globalization, nudged by a global technocratic elite, was alive
and kicking, back then.
Today we face a crisis of the regime of international economic law and, more broadly,
global economic governance. The system appears broken for its incapacity to face some
of the most daunting challenges of our time: the widespread and dramatic process
of environmental degradation and the unacceptable inequalities between poor and
rich. On its face, the phenomenon of far-right populists, partly reflected in Brexit and
Trump politics, and spreading across the Atlantic is shaking the system of international
economic law, by hailing nationalist policies. The idea that the nation-state may be a
desirable source of disintegration of the global (legal) order is gaining traction across
the political spectrum. It appears clear that the answer to the legitimacy crisis of the
system of international economic law and governance offered by progressives3 resorts
also to entrusting the nation state with more political space—a space that allegedly has
been unduly constrained by the global economic order.
Not only politicians but also progressive academicians, such as Professor Dani
Rodrik, have defended the importance of national sovereignty,4 as one of the necessary
paradigms to fix our broken world order. The gist of the reasoning is simple: global
institutions went too far in eroding national sovereignty, which is the real basis for
democratic liberal regimes. Without the nation-state, environmental, industrial, and
1 Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch and Richard B. Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’, 68
(3–4) Law and Contemporary Problems 15 (2005); Sabino Cassese et al., Global Admistrative Law: Cases,
Materials and Issues (Rome: Istituto di Ricerche sulla Pubblica Amministrazione, 2008); Jean Klabbers, Anne
Peters and Geir Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2009).
2 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Jason Hickel, The
Divide: A Brief Guide to Global Inequality and Its Solutions, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 2017).
3 One example is the support of democratic senator Elisabeth Warren to Trump trade policy. See William
Mauldin and Ted Mann, The Wall Street Journal, 11 March 2018. https://www.wsj.com/articles/gop-talks-
of-bill-to-thwart-tariffs-while-democrat-warren-applauds-trump-1520792857.
4 Dani Rodrik, Straight Talk on Trade: Ideas for a Sane World Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2018); see also Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy (New
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redistributive policies cannot be realized. As Rodrik put it: ‘So, I accept that nation-
states are a source of disintegration for the global economy.’5
This article critically engages with the idea that the nation-state is a legitimate force
of disintegration of the international economic order, with particular attention to trade
and investment agreements. There are disparate circumstances, from the realm of food
safety regulation to the regulation of capital flows,6 in which it is arguably desirable
that domestic institutions (re-)gain more power. Most importantly, the nation-state is
today an important site of democracy and, only for that reason, it is worth defending.
Yet, in times of raising authoritarianism, it is crucial to reflect on some of the limits of
the nation-state and on the necessity to develop alternative paradigms for integrating
economies and societies.
This article presents a two-fold critique of the idea that an expansion of national
sovereignty is going to achieve a better socio-economic world order per se. The first cri-
tique is internal, showing that the nation-state does not possess intrinsic characteristics
to facilitate democracy, equality, and sustainability. The second is external and focuses
on the necessity to look reflexively at the goals of the system of international economic
law, to re-imagine it as capable to address questions of inequality and environmental
degradation.
In a more pragmatic fashion, this article posits that more nation-state may be a
misleading and possibly dangerous response to today’s daunting challenges. It is mis-
leading in so far as it promises solutions that nation-states alone cannot deliver. It is
dangerous in so far as the rhetoric of the nation-state paradoxically facilitates the turn
toward an expansion of the ‘rule of exception’ and, eventually, authoritarianism. Above
all, in advocating for disintegration through the nation-state, we need to reckon with our
haunting past where economic autarchy has been deeply intertwined with the ascent of
fascism and Nazism. If today the nation-state may appear as a beacon of democracy, the
role of nationalism in generating the nemesis of democracy should not be neglected.
In short, and at the risk of oversimplification, ‘America first’ echoes too closely fascist
slogans.7
5 Ibid, Rodrik (2018), at 25.
6 See Rodrik (2018), at 213 for a discussion of the importance of controls of capital flows.
7 Mussolini used similar slogans in fascist Italy. As reported by a scholar in 1938: ‘Preferite il prodotto italiano,
“Buy Italian”, became a slogan to be encountered everywhere, from the smallest village to the national’s capital’
see William G. Welk, Fascist Economy Policy; An Analysis of Italy’s Economic Experiment (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1938) 175. This is not to say that protectionist trade policies are always and necessarily
bound up with illiberalism and fascism. Yet, it is an important reminder of the salience of autarchy for the
economic policy of fascist regimes. As put by Trotsky in 1934, ‘Italian fascism has proclaimed national “sacred
egoism” as the sole creative factor. After reducing the history of humanity to national history, German fascism
proceeded to reduce nation to race, and race to blood. Moreover, in those countries which politically have
not risen—or rather, descended—to fascism, the problems of economy are more and more being forced into
national frameworks. Not all of them have the courage to inscribe “autarchy” openly upon their banners. But
everywhere policy is being directed toward as hermetic a segregation as possible of national life away from
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I. A PROGRESSIVE DEFENSE OF THE NATION-STATE AND THE RISK OF A
‘SCHMITTEAN MOMENT’
Let me start by rehashing the two interconnected and equally formidable challenges we
are facing today: the question of environmental degradation and the unacceptable level
of inequalities whereby a large part of the population in the world lives in poverty (both
in developing and developed countries, but still overwhelmingly concentrated in so-
called developing countries) vis-à-vis a small elite enjoying incredible wealth. Economic
integration that does not deal with these challenges is not only doomed to fail; it is a type
of economic integration that we should not aspire to.
It is plausible that Brexit and the disintegrationist economic policy of Trump have
been partly enabled by the growing inequalities in the Anglophone nations. It is no
brainer that a large fraction of Brexiteers and Trump voters are the ‘left behind.’8 In
wealthy countries, the working class often felt left behind by thriving globalization,
which has benefited only the elites. The—often labelled—‘populist turn’ rests on the
idea that the ‘other’, the ‘foreigner’ has stolen ‘our’ welfare and a more nationalistic policy
is needed to protect the losers of the current state of affairs. This is evident from Trump’s
slogan ‘Buy American, Hire American.’ It is worrying how this type of nationalism is
entrenched in racism and in the othering of the non-American.
However, as mentioned earlier, the case for more nation-state has also been made by
‘progressive’ politicians and intellectuals. Among progressive economists, Dani Rodrik
stands out for having defended the nation-state with compelling arguments. Let me
quote him at length: ‘When it comes to providing the arrangements that markets rely
on, the nation-state remains the only effective actor, the only game in town. Our elites’ and
technocrats’ obsession with globalism weakens citizenship where it is most needed—at
home—and makes it more difficult to achieve economic prosperity, financial stability,
social inclusion, and other desirable objectives.’9 Not only is the nation-state the only
game in town, when it comes to issues of redistribution, social security and safety,
the nation-state is also desirable because it can deliver institutional diversity which is
needed to realize the social contract: ‘Developing nations have different institutional
requirements than rich nations. There are, in short, strong arguments against global
institutional harmonization.’10 The nation-states can meet different preferences, and
‘[i]nsufficient appreciation of the value of nation-states leads to dead ends.’ Rodrik also
concedes that international market liberalization is the offspring of well-functioning
8 James Wolcott, Vanity Fair, 7 September 2018. https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/09/the-left-behi
nd-trump-voter-has-nothing-more-to-tell-us; Patrick Kingsley, The New York Times, 13 November 2018.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/13/world/europe/un-extreme-poverty-britain-austerity.html. To this
it should be added that the marginalized are only a fraction of the Trump electorate or of the Brexiteers. As
noted by Colin Crouch, supporters of xenophobic movements are often rich individuals living in small villages,
aligning with these movements because of their identity politics, see Colin Crouch, The Globalization Backlash
(Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons, 2018) particularly Chapter 3. It is also to be noted that important libertarian
intellectuals, followers of Hayek, have also been involved in neo-nationalist far right-wing parties, see Quinn
Slobodian, Public Seminars, 15 February 2018. https://publicseminar.org/2018/02/neoliberalisms-populist-
bastards/.
9 Dani Rodrik, Aeon, 2 October 2017. https://aeon.co/essays/capitalists-need-the-nation-state-more-than-i
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nation-states rather than international institutions: ‘Domestic political bargains, more
than GATT rules, sustained the openness that came to prevail.’11 Against this back-
ground, Rodrik defends ‘economic populism’ in so far as it constitutes a form of
resistance to ‘liberal technocrats’ imposing undue restraints on domestic economic
policy.12 The rigid focus on price stability in low-inflation environments is a clear
example of global or EU-driven policies largely insensitive to the effects on employment
and paradoxically even growth.13
Many of Rodrik’s arguments are compelling, such as his critique of the economic
profession’s misleading analysis of trade and investment agreements. Some of his reform
proposals, such as the strengthening of green industrial policy,14 are arguably desirable.
Most crucially, the nation-state may be at present one of the most developed sites of
democracy, albeit an imperfect one. When global institutions constrain nation-state
policies formed following democratic decision-making, this may legitimately be seen as
a threat to democracy. Rodrik’s work has had a wide echo in legal circles, as evidenced
by the publication of a book with the goal of reimagining trade and investment law,
15 which is opened by several chapters all commenting—in overwhelmingly positive
terms—on Rodrik’s Straight Talks on Trade. The nation-state and, more generally,
sovereignty is (re-)gaining traction also among progressive political theorists. In times
of economic and existential uncertainties, sovereignty is there to offer protection ‘from
unfettered markets and from permanently incumbent austerity’ and it constitutes a
‘refusal of a “liquid society” and of its very solid . . . inequalities.’16 Some of the
most lucid analyses of the current international economic order point at the dramatic
consequences of an increase of capitalist power that has incapacitated states to act in
defense of its own people.17 The attention on sovereignty is also partly reflected in
recently negotiated provisions of new trade and investment agreements, where states are
explicitly endowed with a ‘right to regulate.’ Despite the unclear practical implications of
such jargon, its symbolic value is unambiguously bearing witness to the shared view that
states ought to maintain (or regain) political space. Against this background, Trump’s
claims to defend the Ohio steel workers by whatever trade measures it takes may appear
more acceptable. Could we then read in this reinvigorated faith in sovereignty a ‘Grotian
moment’?18
11 Ibid. Also see Rodrik, above n 4.
12 Dani Rodrik, Project Syndicate, 9 January 2018.
13 Rodrik, above n 9, at 4.
14 See Rodrik, Straight Talk, above n 4, at 257–60.
15 Alvaro Santos, Chantal Thomas and David M. Trubek, World Trade and Investment Law Reimagined: A
Progressive Agenda for an Inclusive Globalization (London: Anthem Press, 2019).
16 Carlo Galli, Sovranità (Sovereignity) (Bologna: il Mulino, 2019) 128. As translated by this author.
17 Katharina Pistor, The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2019); see also Katharina Pistor, ‘From Territorial to Monetary Sovereignty’, 18 Theoretical
Inquiries 491 (2017); see also Wolfgang Streek, Buying Time (New York: Verson Books, 2014).
18 Antony Anghie refers to a Grotian moment as a ‘situation where a monumental change has occurred in
international relations’. See Antony Anghie, ‘International Law in a Time of Change: Should International
Law Lead or Follow’, 26 Amsterdam University International Law Review 1315 (2011), at 1318, where he
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Without indulging on this question, this article posits that we should beware the
‘risk’ of entering a ‘Schmittean moment’.19 This term is here used to refer to a major shift
toward an ideal of unfettered national sovereignty as the chief paradigm to re-orient the
international (economic) order. Under such ideal, any international normative bench-
mark is brushed away by an allegedly more intellectually honest ‘political’ dimension,
which can find its realization only in the decisionist state.20 To understand the risk of a
‘Schmittean moment’, it is important to recognize that the move toward more nation-
state is partly animated by the legitimate concerns over the existing international legal
order; legitimate concerns, which have eloquently been articulated by Schmitt himself.
Carl Schmitt’s work offers a lucid critique of the ‘exclusionary character of lib-
eral universalism.’21 His critique exposes the hypocrisy underpinning many univer-
salisms, most prominently the legal canon of ‘just’ war.22 In fact, it is the very core
of the contemporary international legal project that gets questioned: ‘The concept of
humanity is an especially useful ideological instrument of imperialist expansion, and
in its ethical-humanitarian form, it is a specific vehicle of economic imperialism. Here,
one is reminded of a somewhat modified expression of Proudhon’s: whoever invokes
humanity wants to cheat.’23 This argument has direct relevance for the domain of
international economic law. In an endnote to this claim—discussing the extermination
of Indians in North America—Schmitt explains the danger to use certain moral canons
as exclusionary devices: ‘As civilization progresses and morality rises, even less harmless
things than devouring human flesh could perhaps qualify as deserving to be outlawed
in such a manner. Maybe one day, it will be enough if people were unable to pay its
debts.’24 This consideration is of extreme actuality in relation to the current inter-
national legal order, which seems to have crystallized structures of annihilation of
debt states, and their very peoples.25 In decrying how the economical is rescinded
by the political, Schmitt unveils the absent ‘presence’ of (mostly American) politics
in the economy. In short, Schmitt’s analysis cogently engages with the problem of
depoliticization that the international liberal order yields.26 It is at this juncture that
the thoughts of Schmitt and Rodrik may intersect. In some sense, Schmitt’s critique
19 One of the most relevant books by Carl Schmitt in relation to the field of international law is Carl Schmitt,
The Nomos of the Earth (Candor: Telos Press Publishing, 2006).
20 In ‘The Concept of the Political’, Schmitt starts by denouncing the emptiness of conceptions of the state, to
put forward his own decisionist view. ‘In its literal sense and in its historical appearance, the state is a specific
entity of a people. Vis-à-vis the many conceivable kinds of entities, it is in the decisive case, the ultimate
authority.’ See Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Expanded Edition, Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2008) 19.
21 William E. Scheuerman, ‘International Law as Historical Myth’, 11 Constellation 537 (2004).
22 The analysis of Schmitt on this theme is acute and erudite, interweaving the thoughts of illustrious intellec-
tuals of the past. In illustrating the problems underpinning the concept of just war, for example, he connects
in the same page the thought of Erasmus (Cui non videtur causa sua justa? [Who does not see his own cause
as just?]) to Gentile (Bellum juste geri utrumque [War justifies everything]). See Schmitt, above n 19, at
156.
23 See Schmitt, above n 20, at 54.
24 Ibid, at 54, in endnote 23.
25 See Streek, above n 17.
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resonates with the critique of ‘hyper-globalization’ articulated by Rodrik:27 ‘one type
of failure arose from pushing rule making onto supranational domains too far beyond
the reach of political debate and control.’28
Before elaborating on this intersection, it is key to rehash some flaws of Schmitt’s
analysis. While he has certainly a point in showing how liberal universalism can be used
to arbitrarily exert hegemonic power in the name of humanity (and has so been used
in such way by the US and other predominantly Western countries), the alternative he
implicitly propounds rests on a nostalgia for a mythical past—a golden age based on
the jus publicum Europaeum. Regrettably, this age has been golden only for some; the
jus publicum Europaeum for all its glory was made of colonial relations, exploitation,
and violence. It has also been noted how Schmitt’s historical analysis, which portrays
the times of the jus publicum Europaeum as times where war gets domesticated by the
modern state eclipses the fact that the ‘development of the modern state apparatus . . .
helped bring about unprecedented capacities for organized state violence, even if such
violence was no longer typically unleashed against fellow Europeans.’29 His conception
of sovereignty, which finds essential realization only in the ‘unlimited jurisdictional
competence’ normalizes the rule of exception. A related trouble with Schmitt’s core
normative ideas is the totalizing enemy-friendship antithesis: ‘the distinction of friend
and enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an asso-
ciation or dissociation.’30 This is particular fatal to an ideal of nonviolent international
law, as it denies even the aspiration of solidarity beyond borders.31 In other words,
Schmitt conceptualization of the international legal order crystallizes nation-state bor-
ders in deeper existential structures, leaving no hope for common projects of different
communities inhabiting the earth. In exposing the violence of allegedly humanitarian
projects, Schmitt is de facto hollowing out the concept humanity, reducing its essence
to violence in potentia: ‘the entire life of a human being is a struggle and every human
being symbolically a combatant. The friend, enemy, and combat concepts receive their
real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing.’32
In denouncing the hypocrisy of moralism, Schmitt seems to negate the possibility of
morality altogether. The Nomos of the earth, starting with the act of appropriation—
nehmen (take)—and continuing with dividing the land—nemein (divide)—does not
27 Hyperglobalization has been defined as ‘the attempt to eliminate all transaction costs that hinder trade and
capital flows’ See Rodrik (2018), above n 4, at 28.
28 Ibid, at 28–29.
29 See Scheuerman, above n 21, at 543.
30 See Schmitt above, n 20, at 26. And further at 35, for the totalizing nature of the friend-enemy distinction:
‘War as the most extreme political means discloses the possibility which underlies every political idea,
namely, the distinction of friend and enemy.’ Schmitt seems to implicitly moralize his distinction by arguing
that the enemy is ‘public’ and, hence, does not need to be hated. He does that by drawing further distinctions:
the public enemy is hostis and not inimicus. He also seems to ‘excuse’ himself by noting that the Christian
‘Love your enemy’ adage is originally formulated as ‘diligite inimicos vestros;’ apparently Jesus was not
thinking of hostis but of inimicus. Besides this disputable Schmittean reading of the Gospel, it remains
unconvincing how legitimating the destruction of the enemy, even if only hostis and not inmicus, could do
any justice to the enemy.
31 For a discussion of the plausibility of cross-border solidarity see Crouch, above n 8.
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engage with the morality of the first act of appropriation nor with its division. And this
is also what Hanna Arendt contests to Schmitt: ‘to remove justice from the content of
the law.’33
Schmitt’s critique may leave us with a form of brutal and absolute sovereignty. The
risk of a ‘Schmittean moment’ then translates into the danger of too easily reading into a
(re-)empowerment of the nation-state the road to salvation, whereas in practice, it could
yield ‘hypersovereigns.’ Anthony Anghie has used the term ‘hyper-sovereign states’ to
refer to the possibility of states to dominate others in the name of democracy, with
actions disregarding basic rules of international law, such as those pertaining to human
rights and the use of force.34 As well exemplified by the case of US foreign policy, the
hypersovereign can transform democratic states into rogue states.35 In this context, it is
worth recalling that the work of Carl Schmitt has been associated to the one of Anthony
Anghie.36 True, both scholars have provided a lucid critique of international law, as a
system enabling hegemonic power—the former even with some prescience of the years
to come. Yet, it is crucial to distinguish the critical enterprises of these scholars. As noted
by Benhabib, ‘Schmitt critiques American behavior not to offer a new law of nations
but rather to undermine it altogether.’37 By contrast, for all its critical analysis of the
past, the work of Anghie remains future-oriented, leaving us with the nonviolent and
constructive question: ‘Is it possible to imagine a nonimperial world?’38 Anghie warns
us against the hypersovereign, while Schmitt implicitly legitimizes its existence.39
Let us now go back to Rodrik’s case for the nation-state. The work by Dani Rodrik has
always been respectful of developing countries and nonwestern cultures. His rigorous
and enlightening empirical work has in fact defended growth models of certain devel-
oping countries (particularly the Asian tigers), going against the grain of the golden
standard of the west, i.e. the Washington consensus.40 In this sense, Rodrik’s analysis is
33 Hanna Arendt, Marginalia on The Nomos of the Earth, as cited and studied by Anna Jurkevics, ‘Hannah
Arendt reads Carl Schmitt’s The Nomos of the Earth: A dialogue on law and geopolitics from the margins’, 16
European Journal of Political Theory 345 (2017), at 350.
34 See Anghie, supra n 18, particularly at 1339–40.
35 Ibid, at 1341.
36 See, for example, René Urena, ‘Deciding what is Humane: Towards a Critical Reading of Humanity as
a Normative Standard in International Law’, in Britta van Beers, Luigi Corrias and Wouter G. Wernerat
(eds), Humanity across International Law and Biolaw (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014)
178. Anghie himself refers to the work of Schmitt, see for example, Anghie supra n 18, at 1357–58, fn
19 and 1367. See also, Martti Koskenniemi, presentation on ‘Fascism and International Law: History,
Technology and Representation’ (Workshop at the Fascism and the International Conference held on 24,
26 May 2018 in Melbourne), available https://www.fascismandtheinternational.com/audio-visual; during
this presentation, Martti Koskenniemi draws a parallel between the two scholars.
37 Seyla Benhabib, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Kant: Sovereignty and International Law’, 40 Political Theory
688 (2012).
38 Antony Anghie, ‘International Law in a Time of Change: Should International Law Lead or Follow’, 26
American University International Law Review 1315 (2011), at 1367.
39 Anghie himself compares some of his arguments to those of Schmitt, particularly the critique of the concept
of ‘just war.’ In making this link, Anghie distantiates himself from Schmitt noting that Schmitt resolves the
critique by asserting ‘that the soverign decides what is just and unjust.’ See Anghie, supra n 38, at 1357,
fn 119. More generally, see Anthony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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miles away from Schmitt. Yet, the risks inherent in advocating for the nation-state as a
source of disintegration should be carefully pondered.
Arguing for more nation-state or state sovereignty eludes the key questions of how
to live together on earth and how to face the contingent challenges of inequalities and
environmental degradation. Rodrik may be aware of this problem, when he engages
in imaging new rules for the global economy. However, his analysis overlooks the
latent risks of hypersovereignty. This neglect is particularly prominent in some of the
‘common-sense solutions’ he advances. For example, he proposes that ‘nondemocratic
countries cannot count on the same rights and privileges in the international economic
order as democracies.’41 Here he seems to fall back on a conception of ‘democratic
sovereignty’, which can too easily lend legitimacy to the hypersovereign. In fact, hyper-
sovereignty and hyperglobalization may appear as two sides of the same coin. By
juxtaposing the nation-state to the global legal order, we dodge the questions of which
goals, rules, and institutions are promoting global justice and a peaceful co-existence of
different communities inhabiting the Earth. In eluding such questions, we run the risk of
paving the way to new forms of hypersovereignty, while stifling transformative projects
where law can be used for emancipatory purposes. In other words, redirecting efforts to
disintegrating the global order and re-empowering the nation-state may miss the point
of the difficult tasks ahead. The next sections aim at corroborating this statement by
elaborating on the intrinsic limits of the nation-state and of absolute sovereignty as an
ordering criterion for the international legal order.
II. THE INTRINSIC LIMITATIONS OF THE NATION-STATE AND THE
LOOMING RISK OF HYPERSOVEREIGNTY
Let us now go back to the noble goals animating Straight Talk on Trade: economic
prosperity, equity, and democracy. The first problem with advocating for more nation-
state is that the nation-state as such is neither protecting equality nor democracy. The
nation-state can do wonderful for its citizens, but it can also oppress them through
violence, as Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Spain did—to mention a few. By definition,
authoritarian states are neither protecting democracy nor fostering pluralism. Arguably
softer authoritarian regimes, such as contemporary China, are also far from fostering
democracy and pluralism. Suffices to think of the Uighur, which for their different
identity continue to be prosecuted in China today.42 This point is trivial but worth being
re-stated, to dispel the false dichotomy global/nondemocratic vs national/democratic.
One of the most powerful arguments by Rodrik is that re-empowering the nation-
state is a way to enhance institutional diversity. While intuitive, this point fails to address
the question that the nation-state rests on its own ‘demiurgic universalism’, aspiring to
create a unity, which flattens out existing diversity.43 It is no coincidence that ‘the right
41 See Rodrik, Straight Talk, above n 4.
42 Roland Hughes, BBC, 8 November 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-45474279.
43 The expression ‘demiurgic universalism’ is borrowed from Peter Fitzpatrick (ed.) 1995, Nationalism, Racism
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wing Weimer scholars, notably Carl Schmitt, opposed what they regard as the pluralistic
party political system of parliamentary democracy.’44
When it comes to equality and redistribution, the nation-state does not fare better.
Take the US, as a paradigmatic example of highly rich societies fraught with severe
inequalities.45 There is ample evidence that inequality has been growing exponentially
in the past century in the US.46 The key question here is whether the nation-state
through its very domestic policies has had a role to play in it. Data about wealth
distribution in the US seem to point at the responsibility of the nation-state.47 US
taxation policy of the past 30 years may be seen as the chief culprit. What lies at the
core of regressive redistribution is domestic policy, whereby the richest strata of society
have been de-taxed, causing shrinking public budgets and less capacity of establishing
policies of solidarity. To one account, a redistribution from the richest to the poorer
strata of society may greatly reduce inequality. A downward redistribution of income
from the richest 1% to the bottom 40% of the income distribution would be sufficient to
double the income of the latter.48 The inequality has further increased with the tax cut
initiated by President Reagan. Gregory Shaffer recounts that ‘[t]he two major tax cuts of
the Reagan era dropped the top marginal income tax rate for the rich from 70 to 38.5%.
These tax cuts tripled the national debt to 2.6 trillion dollars, leading to severe budget
cuts that constrained the ability of the state to provide support for vulnerable citizens.
They had significant adverse effects on state support, ranging from public education
to health insurance, from child care to job training.’ 49 As the US case exemplifies, the
44 David Dyzenhaus, ‘Kelsen, Heller and Schmitt: Paradigms of Sovereignty Thought’, 16 Theoretical Inquiries
L. 337 (2015), at 340.
45 The US as rich country is a paradigmatic example, but by no means the only country displaying high levels of
inequality. There is solid evidence that other countries and regions suffer from comparable inequalities. See
Thomas Piketty, Capital and Ideology (Harvard University Press, 2020). As detailed by the quantitative study
by Piketty, inequality within countries/regions has grown in some of the most important states/regions in
the world; as he writes: ‘Take, for example, India, the United States, Russia, China, and Europe. The share of
the top decile in each of these five regions stood at around 25–35% in 1980 but by 2018 had risen to between
35 and 55%.’ at 19, Fig. I.3. Piketty further shows how inequality within states/regions is virtually present all
over the world. One potential justification for inequality could be that—seen from a dynamic perspective—
it stimulates growth and ultimately benefits the poor. Piketty counters this reasoning by further observing
that the growth in inequality is not associated with economic growth: ‘Growth rates in both Europe and the
United States were higher, for example, in the egalitarian period (1950–1980) than in the subsequent phase
of rising inequality. This casts doubt on the argument that greater inequality is always socially useful.’ Ibidem
at 23.
46 Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman, ‘Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913: Evidence from
Capitalized Income Tax Data’, 131 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 519 (2016). (The authors find that
wealth concentration was high at the beginning of the 20th century, fell between 1929 and 1978 and has
consistently risen since 1978.)
47 For the US, see Joseph Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2013).
48 Dean Baker, Rigged: How Globalization and the Rules of the Modern Economy Were Structured to Make the Rich
Richer (Washington, DC: Center for Economic and Policy Research, 2016), see in particular at p. 15 where
he writes: ‘the share of the 1% has more than doubled from its level during most of the period of the 1950–
1980. Measured as a share of total income, this increase is roughly 10.0% points. This would be sufficient to
increase the income of everyone in the bottom 90% of the income distribution by more than 20%. It would
be almost enough to double the income of the bottom 40%. In short, this upward redistribution has had a
substantial impact on the living standards of the rest of the population.’
49 Gregory Shaffer, ‘Retooling Trade Agreements for Social Inclusion’, 1 University of Illinois Law Review 17
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nation-state can have its own share of responsibility for growing inequalities. This is
likely to be the case for other countries as well. For example, Philip Alston, the UN
rapporteur on extreme poverty, when visiting Britain in 2018 is reported to have said:
‘The UK was a world leader in social security after World War II, it was a world leader on
privatization on a large scale and it is a world leader right now in self-imposed austerity.’50
If the above indicates that the nation-state has limitations in bringing about democ-
racy and equality, there is another powerful argument suggesting care before advocating
disintegration by the nation-state, namely the fragility of the nation-state in a world of
geopolitics. This argument echoes the risk of hypersovereignty that underlies a ‘return’
to the nation-state, already mentioned in the previous section. The ongoing move of
the US to weaken the multilateral order, by resorting to the rule of exception through
invoking an implausible national security exception in defense of its trade measures, or
by unapologetically killing the WTO Appellate Body, is the barest manifestations of the
risk of a Schmittean moment. But these are by no means the only sites where the risk
materializes.
Take, for example, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement.51 According
to Rodrik, this Agreement embodies procedural rules ‘pertaining to transparency,
broad representation, accountability, and use of scientific/economic evidence’ which
could ‘improve domestic decision-making.’52 However, the SPS agreement contains
provisions, which have attracted criticisms for their potential of eroding democracy and
institutional diversity.53 It is this Agreement, together with the TBT and the TRIPS
Agreements that can be seen as the bastion of global technocracy. The SPS Agreement
in a sense, encompasses contradictory tendencies: on the one hand, the emphasis
on science has a strong potential to be turned into ‘scientism’ that is a ‘discourse or
imposed on the wealthiest 0.1% of Americans. In 2017, they increased the exempted amount of wealth to
$20 million (for couples), indexed for inflation, up from $675,000 in 2000, and they reduced the tax rate on
these estates from a high of 77% from 1941–1977 to 40%.’ See also Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-first
Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014). Piketty discusses the reduction in progressive income
taxation in Britain. Interestingly both the US and Britain, who championed the attacks on social welfare state,
mainly through Tatcherism and Reaganomics are now leading in the disintegration of the current system of
international economic law.
50 See Kingsley, above n 8; Patrick Kingsley, The New York Times, 16 November 2018. Emphasis added. https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/11/16/world/europe/uk-un-poverty-austerity.html. See also Rupert Neate, The
Guardian, 3 December 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/news/2019/dec/03/uk-six-richest-people-
control-as-much-wealth-as-poorest-13m-study.
51 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Final Act Embodying the Results of
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 15 April
1994 (‘SPS Agreement’). Annex 1A.
52 Rodrik, Straight Talk, above n 4, at 226.
53 The precarious relation between science, democracy and regulatory law, as inscribed into trade law, has
been discussed by L. Busch, R. Grove-White, S. Jasanoff, D. Winickoff and B. Wynne, ‘Amicus Curiae Brief
Submitted to the Dispute Settlement Panel of the WTO in the case of EC-Biotech’ (WT/DS291, 292 and
293) (2004), re-published as a scholarly article, David E. Winickoff et al, ‘Adjudicating the GM Food Wars:
Science, Risk, and Democracy in World Trade Law’, 30 Yale Journal of International Law 81 (2005). See also
David E. Winickoff and Douglas M. Bushey, ‘Science and power in global food regulation: The rise of the
Codex Alimentarius’, 35 Science, Technology, & Human Values 356 (2010). For a relatively more optimistic
view, see Robert Howse, ‘Democracy, Science, and Free Trade: Risk Regulation Trial at the World Trade
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framework for discussion that excludes considerations of distributional and other social
impact criteria in the determination by a regulatory agency that a product is or is not
suitable for markets . . . . In its neoliberal form, scientism tends to restrict democratic
participation and weakens the option for governments to regulate . . . .’54 On the other
hand, the Agreement offers space for a reading of the text respectful of democracy
and plurality, and the Appellate Body has partly entrenched this reading into its body
of jurisprudence.55 The point here is that this imperfect multilateralism, thanks to its
rhetoric (e.g. right to regulate jargon), some indeterminacy of the norms and a relatively
transparent and symmetrical dispute settlement mechanism, could become a site to
foster international regulatory dialectic and defy domination.56
It is telling that the US, in its recently negotiated US–China trade agreement, 57 has
included clauses that would oblige China to import US hormone-treated beef and that
would enhance the legal normativity of the Codex standards on ractopamine, despite
key controversies on their adoption.58 The nuances of the SPS Agreement, and its
sophisticated reading by the Appellate Body, are wiped out with one stroke. The brutal
face of the hypersovereign is looming behind the one of the neoliberal globalists.
54 Moore et al., ‘Science and Neoliberal Globalization: A Political Sociological Approach’, 40 Theory and
Society 505 (2011), at 517.
55 See Alessandra Arcuri, ‘Global food safety standards: The evolving regulatory epistemology at the inter-
section of the SPS Agreement and the Codex Alimentarius Commission’, in Panagiotis Delimatsis (ed), ‘The
Law, Economics and Politics of International Standardisation’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015)
79–103; The case where the Appellate Body has shown the most sophisticated understanding of risk assess-
ment provision is US—Continued Suspension; WTO Appellate Body Report, United States—Continued
Suspension of Obligations in the EC—Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/AB/R, adopted 14 November 2008,
para 534.
56 For a similar argument, see Arcuri, Alessandra and Federica Violi, ‘Reconfiguring Territoriality in Interna-
tional Economic Law’, in Martin Kuijer and Wouter Werner (eds), Netherlands Yearbook of International Law
2016 (Berlin: Springer, 2017) 175–215, particularly at 190–94.
57 Economic and Trade Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the People’s Republic of China, 15 January 2020. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/
files/agreements/phase%20one%20agreement/Economic_And_Trade_Agreement_Between_The_U
nited_States_And_China_Text.pdf . For a first comment on the agreement see International Economic
Law and Policy Blog, ‘So Many Questions About the US China Trade Deal’, https://ielp.worldtradelaw.ne
t/2020/01/so-many-questions-about-the-us-china-trade-deal.html (visited 12 April 2020).
58 For the standards of Beef, see Annex 4(5) of Article 3.1 of the Agreement, which reads: ‘Within one month of
the date of entry into force of this Agreement, China shall adopt maximum residue limits (MRLs) for zeranol,
trenbolone acetate, and melangesterol acetate for imported beef. For beef tissues for which Codex has
established MRLs for these hormones, China shall adopt the Codex MRLs. For beef tissues for which Codex
has not established MRLs for these hormones, China shall adopt its MRLs by following Codex standards
and guidelines and referring to MRLs established by other countries that have performed science-based risk
assessments.’ For the standards on ractopamine see Annex 7(5) of the Agreement: ‘In consultation with
U.S. experts, China shall conduct a risk assessment for ractopamine in cattle and swine as soon as possible
without undue delay, and in a manner consistent both with Codex and FAO/World Health Organization
(WHO) Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives ( JECFA) risk assessment guidance and with the risk
assessment for ractopamine previously conducted by the FAO/WHO JECFA.’ In the past, China has strongly
opposed the adoption of standards for ractopamine, (i.e. Maximum Residue Levels, MRLs) at the Codex
Alimentarius Commission. For analyses of the underpinning controversies, see Alberto Alemanno and
Giuseppe Capodieci, ‘Testing the Limits of Global Food Governance: The Case of Ractopamine’, 3 European
Journal of Risk Regulation 400 (2012); Ching Fu Lin, ‘Scientification of Politics or Politicization of Science:
Reassessing the Limits of the Codex Alimentarius Commission’, 15 Columbia Science and Technology Law
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A similar parable is discernible in the dynamics by which Intellectual Property
Rights have penetrated the trade regime and how they have been resisted. The TRIPS
Agreement is possibly exhibit A for the inscription of neoliberal legality into the trade
regime. It is hardly controversial to say that pharmaceutical corporations and big tech
companies are the main sponsors and beneficiaries of the TRIPS Agreement. Even
for self-professed trade liberalization advocates, ‘TRIPs . . . were like the introduction
of cancer cells into a healthy body. For virtually the first time, the corporate lobbies
in pharmaceuticals and software had deformed an important multilateral institution,
turning it away from its trade mission and rationale and transforming it into a royalty
collection agency.’59 At the same time, this area of WTO law has undergone one of the
most successful reforms. The TRIPS Agreement has been amended by the Decision of
the General Council of 6 December 2005 on an Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement,
which implements the 2001 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and public
health.60 The Doha declaration, especially where it asserts ‘members’ right to protect
public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all’ can be read as
an attempt to subject the protection of capital to the one of human beings.61 What
has been achieved at the multilateral level, however, risks to be undone on a bilateral
level through the acceptance of TRIPS-plus provisions.62 Also in this case, the latent
hypersovereign may fast-forward the capitalist dream. Maybe prescient of the risk of a
Schmittean moment, it was one of the harshest critics of globalization, to defend the
multilateralism of the WTO: ‘to call for its destruction is like calling for the dissolution
of a corrupt parliament in favour of the monarchy. It is to choose unilateralism over
multilateralism.’63
III. THE MYTH OF HYPER-GLOBALIZATION: AN INTERMEZZO
BEYOND SEMANTICS
If the above arguments point at the dark side of the nation-state, and at the dark side
of impoverished multilateral institutions, they do not detract from the main argument
that hyperglobalization is implicated in inequality and environmental degradation. But
what is ‘hyper’ about hyperglobalization? In fact, while trade and capital mobility have
increased massively, people remain hostage of borders, walls, plane baggage’s cargoes64
and sinking ships. By relegating migration to the level of the domestic and elevating
59 Jagdish Bhagwati, Defense of Globalization (2004) 183.
60 See Decision of the General Council of 6 December 2005 on an Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement.
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_E/trips_e/wtl641_e.htm.
61 Abbott F.M., ‘The Doha Declaration on the Trips Agreement and Public Health: Lighting a Dark Corner at
the WTO’, 5 Journal of International Economic Law 469 (2002), at 505.
62 Mittal and Sandeep, ‘Effects of TRIPS Plus Provisions in International Trade Agreements Upon Access to
Medicines in Developing Countries’, 776 Journal of Intellectual Property Rights ( JIPR) (2017) ISSN: 0975-
1076 (Online); 0971-7544 (Print) JIPR Vol. 22(6) (2017) 295–302. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/a
bstract=2975649 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2975649.
63 George Monbiot, Universal Fair Trade, 8 September 2003. http://www.monbiot.com/2003/09/08/unive
rsal-fair-trade/.
64 Nicole Chavez, CNN, 7 July 2019. https://edition.cnn.com/2019/07/06/us/airplane-stowaways/index.
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commodity and capital at the level of the international, international economic treaties
have normalized the erasure of the human. The annihilation of the human is well cap-
tured by the contrasting images ‘of a ship filled with steel containers securely transport-
ing goods across deep waters . . . [a]longside images of perilously overcrowded boats,
transporting desperate migrants, all too often to their deaths.’65 Criticizing the word
hyperglobalization is not just a matter of semantics. It is a matter of acknowledging that
globalization has never been hyper,66 it has been neoliberal or ‘ordoglobalist’ at best.67
It is true that neoliberals have often aimed at marginalizing the nation-state. From this
vantage point, advocating for more nation-state could be a proxy for advocating for a
less neoliberal global order. At the same time, this jargon may obscure the relationship of
neoliberals or ‘ordoglobalists’ with the state and public powers.68 As well documented
in the book by Quinn Slobodian, Globalist, the ordoglobalist rejected the nation-state
in so far as it threatened private property and the protection of capital, while invoked it
to counter social movements, such as the labor unions.69 The view of Mises, one of the
founding fathers of neoliberalism, were tainted with racism and were condescending to
the use of violence to repress democracy.70 Even more, at times, the hyperglobalist has
been a neoliberal nationalist in disguise.71 The concrete neoliberal policies developed
65 Adelle Blackett, ‘Transnational Futures of International Labor Law’, 113 American Journal of International
Law (2020), at 392. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/aji
l-unbound-by-symposium/transnational-futures-of-international-labor-law.
66 It should be noted that Rodrik himself has pointed out at the contractions of not decreasing the barriers
of labor mobility, see Dani Rodrik, Foreign Policy, 27 January 2017; see also Chantal Thomas, ‘Irregular
Migration and International Economic Asymmetry’, in Alvaro Santos, Chantal Thomas and David M.
Trubek (eds), ‘World Trade and Investment Law Reimagined: a Progressive Agenda for an Inclusive Globalization’
(London: Anthem Press, 2019) 11 (arguing that trade liberalization of commodities, and more particularly
NAFTA has cause increased migration).
67 Quinn Slobodian, Globalists: The End of an Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2018). Slobodian coins the word ordoglobalism to describe the focus on the global order
of the ordoliberals at the Geneva School (see discussion at 12). For a critical analysis of the influence of
ordoliberalism in international law, see Ntina Tzouvala, The Ordo-Liberal Origins of Modern International
Investment Law: Constructing Competition on a Global Scale in John D. Haskell and Akbar Rasulov (eds),
‘European Yearbook on International Economic Law’ (Berlin: Springer, 2019).
68 See Slobodian supra n 67, where he writes: ‘The core of ordoglobalism is its own version of what Polanyi
called re-embedding the market. The crucial difference between him and the neoliberals is the ends to which
the market is being re-embedded. For Polanyi, it was to restore a measure of humanity and social justice. For
neoliberals, it was to prevent state projects of egalitarian redistribution and secure competition, alternatively
defined as the optimal functioning of the price-signaling system.’ Ibid, at 20.
69 ‘Foucault’s attribution of “state-phobia” to Austrian neoliberals is a misunderstanding, especially considering
Mises’s career as an advocate for the use of government taxes to fund business interests. Mises would become
a patron saint to American libertarians, but he not only worked professionally as a state-funded advisor to
the government but also saw a strong role for the state in the protection of property and keeping of the peace.
In a telling phrase from 1922, he called the state “a producer of security.”’ Ibid, at33.
70 Quinn Slobodian, ‘Perfect Capitalism, Imperfect Humans: Race, Migration and the Limits of Ludwig von
Mises’s Globalism’, Contemporary European Hystory (2019). See at 44 where Slobodian quotes the words
of Mises to comment the violent repression by the police during the 1927 strike in Vienna, which killed about
100 people: ‘Friday’s putsch has cleansed the atmosphere like a thunderstorm. The social-democratic party
has used all means of power and yet lost the game. The street fight ended in complete victory of the police
. . . . All troops are loyal to the government.’
71 Sören Brandes, Ephemera, ‘From neoliberal globalism to neoliberal nationalism: An interview with Quinn
Slobodian’. http://www.ephemerajournal.org/contribution/neoliberal-globalism-neoliberal-nationalism-i
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in the nineties rested on similar contradictions, fostering liberalization of commodities
trade, while reinforcing borders for human beings. While Rodrik is precise in defining
hyperglobalization ‘as the attempt to eliminate all transaction costs that hinder trade
and capital flows’,72 using this term may collapse globalization with neoliberalism,
foreclosing the possibility of imagining and working toward the realization of a different
global order. ‘Words are important.’73
If we take a closer look at the wide variety of critiques of the current global economic
order, it is its produced inequalities, its anti-democratic tendencies and its perverse
environmental consequences that are raising concerns. The problem is not the ‘degree’
of globalization but its skewed ‘nature’, privileging capital while marginalizing humanity.
As humanity has been erased by the theories of Schmitt, so it has by the neoliberal
globalists. It is neither the nation-state nor globalization the culprit. It is the elevation
of capital above humanity.
IV. FROM DISINTEGRATION BY NATION-STATE TO NEW
INTEGRATION FANTASIES
In the wake of the globalization backlash, several scholars have articulated reform
proposals to enhance the legitimacy of international economic institutions. Gregory
Shaffer, for example, has recently advanced a series of ambitious reforms for trade
and investment agreements. In Retooling Trade Agreements, he proposes to include new
sets of provisions in WTO, aimed at achieving social inclusion.74 One way to address
inequalities, he argued, is to condition trade liberalization to tax policy. This could be
done by linking WTO law to international tax agreements, in a similar vein as already
done in the context of the TBT and SPS Agreement. Constructive unilateralism is
presented as a fallback option, which could eventually mobilize international coordi-
nation on this key area.75 This proposal resounds with other previously articulated
reforms by Tim Meyer, who pleaded for the inclusion of an Economic and Development
Chapter that would mandate domestic re-distributional policies to offset the effects of
liberalization in international trade agreements.76
On their face, these proposals may seem to corroborate the point that the nation-
state is the unit to be emancipated in the international legal order. What these proposals
do, however, is to reimagine the international economic order following a different
aspiration than just protecting capital. It is neither the national nor the international
New Political Divide between National Economies’, 15 February 2018. http://www.publicseminar.
org/2018/02/neoliberalisms-populist-bastards/.
72 Rodrik, supra note 4, at 28.
73 This is a quote from an Italian cult film, Palombella Rossa by Nanni Moretti, in which the protagonist,
Michele Apicella gets mad at the use of certain expressions by a journalist. In the film he says: ‘Chi parla
male, pensa male e vive male. Bisogna trovare le parole giuste. Le parole sono importanti.’ ‘Who talks bad,
thinks bad and lives bad. We need to find the right words, Words are important.’ See the relevant movie clip
here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dXrG-itgcho.
74 See above Shaffer, n 49.
75 Gregory Shaffer and Daniel Bodansky, ‘Transnationalism, Unilateralism, and International Law’, 1 Transna-
tional Environmental Law 31 (2012).
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but their renewed interaction that would be reinvigorated—an interaction driven by
a purpose: enhance social inclusion. In other words, such reform proposals would
create a common ground to foster social policy and mitigate the dramatic effects of
tax heavens and other legal protections of transnational capital. The game changer is
further integration (e.g. by embedding cooperative efforts on tax avoidance within the
trade regime), rather than disintegration. Unilateralism would be acceptable only as a
fallback option and within the boundaries of the shared purposes.
In this move, we can read an interlocking of sovereignties, rather than a disintegration
by the nation-state. At this juncture, it is important to disentangle the normative from
the descriptive. Descriptively, many scholars—including those who have theorized
the emergence of a postnational order—agree that the nation-state continues to play
a key role in global affairs.77 In somewhat paradoxical terms, it is the nation-state
that has contributed to its own transformation. The normative question is whether a
disintegrationist move of the nation-state toward re-gaining more power and political
space is desirable. Despite his claim, also Rodrik seems to struggle with the necessity
of an interlocking moment. The normative hollow core of the nation-state as a salvific
entity is revealed by Rodrik’s own account, where he acknowledges that we need ‘traffic
rules’78 and that WTO law should introduce standards of ‘fair’ trade. Against this
observation, Rodrik’s call for disintegration through the nation-state may be read more
as a polemic against the blind neoliberalism underpinning certain dimensions of current
economic globalization, than as a genuine call for a return of the nation-state.
Are we then back to universalism? The point here is that when advocating for the
nation-state and the political, universalism may have been with us all the way. In some
sense, it was there with Schmitt: his ‘attack on the liberal humanists, the neutralizers
and depoliticizers, is not based upon a rejection of universalism but on an unarticulated
distinction between a “false” and a “genuine” universalism.’79 And universalism may
be with Rodrik and progressive critiques to the current international order, where
democracy, egalitarianism and human development are among the universal values
underpinning the analysis. The critique of Rodrik is ‘straight’ up to a point. It is straight
and cogent in proving misguided (and empirically unfounded) the blind faith of the
average economist in trade liberalization. The talk is somewhat more oblique when he
advocates for more nation-state, while also winking at a progressive international legal
order. While Rodrik does well in its polemic with the neoliberal faith in the market, we
are left with the risk of obfuscating the role of a nonviolent international legal order. The
call for rescuing the international comes straight from the present, when a Schmittean
77 See Gregory Shaffer, ‘A Transnational Take on Krisch’s Pluralist Postnational Law’, 23 European Journal of
International Economic Law 565 (2012), at 578; In this respect, see Sassen, as quoted in Shaffer: Saskia
Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2006) 3 (‘The national is still the realm where formalization and institutionalization have all reached
their highest level of development,’ but ‘the national is also often one of the key enablers and enactors of the
emergent global scale’). See also Nico Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
78 See Rodrik (2018) above n 4, at 225.
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rule of exception is increasingly elevated to the norm by powerful and less powerful
world leaders alike (e.g. Trump, Bolsonaro, Orbán).
So, be it: the international, with its ‘horizon of transcendence’,80 where sovereignty
can be only sustainable if compatible with ‘a principle of humanity’,81 is here to stay.
Sovereignty, to be moral, is antinomy. It rests on its contrary: the limit. It is only in the
interstitial space of the external limit, where different sovereign recognizes each other’s
and their incompleteness that international law can develop as a project of aspirational
justice. And it is for this reason, that disintegration (through the nation-state) or
continued integration are per se immaterial to such development—they can only be
if related to their contribution to justice. The universalism underpinning a ‘principle
of humanity’ should however be bound up with history and a need for continuous
‘clarification’ of where it comes from.82 Several scholars clarified that ‘war capitalism’
has driven the emergence of the modern trade and investment regime, mobilizing
lawyers and consultants to shape a particular universalism to sustain itself.83 Thanks
to those scholars, the ‘epistemologies of power and emancipation’84 constructed by
policymakers, state actors and IOs can be better understood, resisted and, in some cases,
subverted. From this vantage point, also the work by Rodrik is crucial as it evidences
the responsibility of the economic profession for having fostered wilful ignorance on
the limits of free trade and on questions of inequalities and environmental injustice
plaguing our institutions.
New integration fantasies necessarily start with the consciousness of the injustice
and misery brought about by the past and present international economic order. But
they do not stop there. New integration fantasies can be imagined to gravitate around
the ‘demands of justice’, as articulated by Linnarelli, Salomon, and Sornarajah.85 These
80 Ibidem, at 511.
81 The term ‘principle of humanity’ is taken from Dezynehaus. In discussing theories of sovereignty, Dezyne-
haus writes: ‘a principle of humanity . . . [that] is about the obligations that attend any exercise of sovereign
power that affects important individual interests. A claim to exercise sovereign power is a claim to authority
over the person affected by the exercise.’ David Dyzenhaus, above n 44, at 343. This passage in turn is quoted
by Benvenisti in his discussion of Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity, see Eyal Benvenisti, ‘The Paradoxes
of Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: Concluding Remarks’, 16 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 535 (2015).
82 The idea of the need of ‘clarification’ was inspired by the following consideration: ‘Clarity is needed on what
is taking place and to deconstruct to reconstruct—to think beyond the constraints imposed by existing insti-
tutions about international trade so that alternative architectures can be seen as realistic possibilities.’ John
Linarelli, Margot E. Salomon, and Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, Misery of International Law (Oxford
University Press, 2018) 110.
83 For a synthesis on how ‘war capitalism’ is related to the regulation of trade see Linarelli et al. above n 82;
the dark history of trade and investment law has been told among others by Anthony Anghie, ‘Finding
the peripheries: Sovereignty and colonialism in nineteenth-century international law’, 40 Harvard Inter-
national Law Journal (1999); Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, Resistance and Change in the International
Law on Foreign Investment (2015) and Kate Miles, ‘International Investments Law: Origins, Imperialism and
Conceptualizing the Environment’, 21 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 1
(2010).
84 Grégoire Mallard and Linsey McGoey, ‘Strategic ignorance and global governance: an ecumenical approach
to epistemologies of global power’, 69 (4) The British Journal of Sociology 884 (2018).
85 See Linnarelli et al., supra n 82, at 42 et ss. The authors provide a cogent justification for this normative
framework. It could also be argued that demands of justice are enshrined in positive law. The 2012 UN
General Assembly Resolution (Declaration) on the rule of law, for example recognizes that ‘that respect for
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could range from an ‘anti-misery principle’, a ‘principle of equality’ to a ‘freedom
from domination or anti-alienation principle.’86 The latter principle would offer a
normative framework to articulate instances and modalities to regulate the relation
national-international. It would not be disintegration by the nation-state, but a form
of nondominant integration. Other principles can also lead to less international law. For
example, if a treaty threatens great misery, and it is unlikely to be radically reformed, exit
may be the only solution to avoid misery. An example, where this could be relevant is
the exit from the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), which poses serious threats to climate
action. In the short term, some disintegration may be socially desirable. The difference
between disintegration by the nation-state and by demands of justice may be subtle
as, in the end, there are cases in which more policy space for the nation-state is to be
looked-for. Yet, within a paradigm of global justice, cross-border solidarity and future
integration remain in the realm of the plausible.87
When driven by demands of justice, disintegration may also lead to new integration
architectures. In moving forward with new integration projects, it is also key (re-)
asserting that the positioning of human rights or the protection of the environment
outside the realm of economics is analytically flawed.88 It is worth reiterating the Greek
etymology of the word ‘economy’: coming from Öikos (house) and nomos/nemein
(yes, the same of the Schmittean Nomos). Economy is hence commonly referred to
as the management of the house. And ‘the house is on fire.’89 With the overwhelming
scientific consensus on the phenomenon of climate change, one should expect that this
organizations, including the United Nations and its principal organs] and accord predictability and legitimacy
to their actions.’ UNGA Res 67/1 (30 November 2012) UN Doc A/RES/67/1. Emphasis added. The quest
for justice in trade regimes has been discussed by other scholarship as well. According to some, for instance,
the following proposition is shared by opponent and advocates of so-called linkage: ‘A very important factor
in determining whether an institutional arrangement for the governance of the global economy should be
viewed as superior to another is whether it improves the level of advantage of less advantaged persons in
the world to a greater extent.’ See Barry, Christian and Reddy, Sanjay G., International Trade and Labor
Standards: A Proposal for Linkage. 39 Cornell International Law Journal 545, at 548.
86 Linarelli et al., above n 82, at 72 et ss.; the principles find a synthesis in the following statement: ‘Ultimately
the requirements for the moral acceptability of international law rests on the notion of whether international
law supports the positive freedom of persons, which means a focus on whether international law contributes
to or works toward eliminating poverty, alienation, exploitation, poor economic opportunities, deprivation,
and other ills that are obstacles to human flourishing.’
87 Colin Crouch has rebutted arguments that cross-border solidarity is not meaningful. For example he writes:
‘The problem with this kind of reasoning, sociologically sound though it is in many respects, is that it leads to
a conservative resistance to any kind of change that tries to move democratic politics and feelings of human
solidarity beyond the nation state, which then remains frozen in time.’ See Crouch, above n 8.
88 For an analysis of the exclusionary implications of this distinction in the realm of investment law, see
Alessandra Arcuri, ‘On Boundaries of International Investment Law as Mechanisms to Exclude Human
Rights and Sustainable Investment’, paper presented at the Conference on ‘Socially Responsible Foreign
Investment under International Law’, Católica Global School of Law, Lisbon, 24–25 October 2019 and at
the Conference on ‘The Legitimate Role for Investment Law and Arbitration in Protecting Human Rights’,
Monash University and the Minerva Centre for Human Rights at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Tøyen
hovedgård, Oslo, 4–5 September 2019. The point of the untenable distinction of the economic from the
noneconomic realm has been made by Linarelli et al. in various contexts. For international trade law, the
authors argue: ‘rules implementing nonmarket values are not exceptions to market rules or exceptional in
their application to markets, but are constitutive of markets.’ above n 82, at 128.
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would be the main preoccupation of institutions of economic governance. The artificial
boundary drawn between the economic and the noneconomic to exclude human rights
or environmental protection is analytically untenable and yet, this argument has often
been made to insulate trade and investment law from the demands of justice. There
is obviously no sane economy without healthy environments or the respect of human
dignity. Despite the simplicity of these arguments, international law has taken the path
of blind functionalism with the corollary that demands of justice are addressed in rather
dysfunctional ways, too often stuck in fragmentation.
The above considerations could help re-direct reform efforts toward justice. Take for
example the idea to include social dumping clauses in trade agreements, advanced by
both Rodrik and Shaffer.90 This reform proposal is said to aim at achieving ‘fair’ trade.
The argument made is that exploitative working conditions, typically in developing
countries, trigger a race to the bottom, which de facto transnationalize exploitation.
This implies, however, that for the trade regime the exploitative working conditions
in the Global South are irrelevant to the extent that they do not have negative conse-
quences in the Global North. It could be countered that social dumping may eventually
be beneficial for the people in the Global South (and East); however, legalizing social
dumping does implicitly accept the normalcy of exploitative working conditions, to the
extent that they do not affect ‘us.’ It is high time for the trade regime to recognize its
implication in the exploitation of labor.91 Introducing rules in trade regime regulating
labor conditions could be seen as an important step in defying the economic/noneco-
nomic boundary. In doing that, however, the demands of justice of all people should
be considered and not only those of the Global North. Grounding reforms in nonxeno-
phobic goals would not only be morally justified, but it would also limit the risk that
so-called hyperglobalization morphs into hypersovereignty.
To be fair, the type of social dumping proposed by Shaffer is well thought-through
and includes procedural norms, which are likely to minimize the risk of hyper-
sovereignty. Most notably, the assessment of social dumping vis-à-vis ILO standards
injects in the system fragments of morality and it may contain the hypersovereign
ambitions of powerful states. On a pragmatic basis, the proposal could also be more
politically feasible, as it is likely to be palatable to the white nationalist. Yet, as academics,
we need to be clear on what would be a political compromise, improving the status quo,
vis-à-vis a just reform.
90 For proposals on including social dumping in trade agreements, see Shaffer, supra n 49, at 33 et ss. and Rodrik,
Straight Talk, above n 4, at 231; a similar idea to social dumping, but to be articulated under a new safeguard
agreement has also been discussed in Rodrik, Globalization Paradox, above n 4, at 258 et ss.. Resorting to a
notion of ‘fair trade’ without having agreed what is ‘fair’ remains the challenge of many reform projects. As
put by Andrew Lang: ‘While it would be naïve to imagine that a single, shared conception of what constitutes
“fair” competition is achievable—or perhaps even desirable—it seems to me that developing a common and
coherent language in which to debate questions of fair institutional competition between different market
orders is one of the key challenges for the international trading order in the years and decades ahead.’ Andrew
Lang, ‘Protectionism’s Many Faces’, Features Symposium: International Trade in the Trump Era, Yale Journal
of International Law (2018), at 60.
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The bold normative core articulated by Linarelli, Salomon, and Sornarajah could
provide the moral compass to orient transformative reforms for the international eco-
nomic law system. One fertile avenue to rethink transformative change is to go back
to the causes of the injustice, i.e. the partial hijack of global institutions of economic
law by neoliberalism. If we agree with Slobodiann that ‘neoliberalism at the global
scale’ is ‘a project of insulating dominium from imperium’, in a countermove we can
open up strategies to mobilize ‘human rights against dominium’92 within the realm of
international economic law. In the context of international investment law, for instance,
scholars have argued that investment-affected communities should be entrusted with
enforceable rights to challenge foreign investors.93 Recent treaty reforms, which include
investors’ obligations (albeit not yet enforceable), may indicate that this transformation
is not unthinkable. The burgeoning climate change litigation provides another source
of inspiration for ways to mobilize (human) rights.94 To become genuinely ‘compre-
hensive’, new international economic treaties should include enforceable rights for all
people against both dominium and imperium (e.g. worker rights, right to a healthy
environment, right to food).
While revising this article, the tragic coronavirus pandemic is unfolding. In all
its urgency, the pandemic is bringing under the spotlight the drama of the risk of
a Schmittean moment, amidst the necessity of curbing the excesses of a neoliberal
global order. This is evidenced by the potential hypersovereign responses, from the
export restrictions of medical products,95 to the more worrying state of emergency
92 Quinn Slobodian, ‘Human Rights Against Dominium’, Humanity Journal, 4 October 2019. http://humani
tyjournal.org/blog/human-rights-against-dominium/. Referring to the work of Amy Kapczynski, in the
context to right to medicines, Slobodian characterizes imperium and dominium in the following terms:
‘In this framing, imperium is the world of states and sovereignty, dominium is the world of property and
ownership.’
93 Alessandra Arcuri, Federica Violi and Francesco Montanaro, ‘Proposal for a Human-Rights Compatible
International Investment Agreement: Arbitration for All’, UN Forum on Business and Human Rights
(2018). https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/IIAs.aspx; Arcuri, Alessandra and Francesco
Montanaro, Justice for All? Protecting the Public Interest in Investment Treaties, 59 Boston College Law
Review 2791 (2018). https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol59/iss8/10.
94 Climate change litigation can be both against dominium and imperium. Examples of climate change litigation
against dominium include: Milieudefensie et al. v. Royal Dutch Shell plc. (overview available at http://clima
tecasechart.com/non-us-case/milieudefensie-et-al-v-royal-dutch-shell-plc/), ClientEarth v. Polska Grupa
Energetyczna (http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/clientearth-v-polska-grupa-energetyczna/), Lli-
uya v. RWE AG (overview available at http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/lliuya-v-rwe-ag/); the
most notable example of climate change litigation against imperium is Urgenda Foundation v. State of the
Netherlands and, State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda; for a recent reflection see André Nollkaemper and Laura
Burgers, A New Classic in Climate Change Litigation: The Dutch Supreme Court Decision in the Urgenda
Case, EJIL:Talk! Blog of the European Journal of International Law, January 6, 2020. https://www.ejiltalk.
org/a-new-classic-in-climate-change-litigation-the-dutch-supreme-court-decision-in-the-urgenda-case/.
95 The problematic implications of export trade restrictions on medical goods have been discussed in a recent
Tradetalks podcast, Peterson Institute For International Economics and Finance, ‘Coronavirus and Trade
Restrictions’, podcast episode 125 aired on 15 March 2020 and featuring Sumaya Keynes and Chad Brown,
available at https://www.tradetalkspodcast.com/podcast/125-coronavirus-and-trade-restrictions/. Back-
ground articles for these discussions are: Soumaya Keynes, The Economist, 11 March 2020; Chad P. Bown,
PIIE Trade and Investment Policy Watch, 19 March 2020; Chad P. Bown, PIIE Trade and Investment Policy
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laws adopted by the Orbán government.96 The hypersovereign responses co-exist with
unfair global rules, such as those normalizing austerity and legalizing the lack of much
needed capital controls.97 A strong public health sector appears a necessary condition
to deal with the public health risk posed by the virus. In turn, this entails the existence
of well-funded public institutions. Likewise, managing the risk to the economy, and
the very people making the economy, does arguably need a manifold response, ranging
from capital controls to the establishment of unemployment benefits for all, the material
realization of the right to food, etc. These institutions, most likely national (although
they could also be imagined as transnational/international or very local), need to
be complemented by multilateral arrangements, which would not simply tame the
latent hypersovereign beast, but most importantly could stir essential international
cooperation and justice. As put by Richard Kozul-Wright and Nelson Barbosa:
‘A return to progressive tax structures, strategic industrial policies, the revival of pub-
lic banks and a willingness to take on vested interests, including large pharmaceutical
companies, will be required if economic recovery is to pave the way to a healthier, more
inclusive and sustainable future. But, in our interdependent world, these measures will
prove insufficient without a multilateral system that promotes and protects the wellbeing
of all people above short-term financial gains and the needs of itinerant international
firms.’98
V. CONCLUSIONS
The last magisterial movie by Ken Loach, Sorry we missed you, shows the brutality of
the work environment of our contemporary deliverymen. The logic of this brutality
is contained in a black box that imparts the order of the delivery: an algorithm real-
izing efficiency dreams. While the film might be read as a story of how technology is
impoverishing us, this is just another story of how capital has been encased in a web
of socio-legal protections in which technology plays only a facilitating function. The
international economic law system can be faulted on similar grounds, for having too
much relied on the same dehumanizing efficiency dream.
In focusing on the nation-state to fix the current order, we elude the question of the
normative core of the international economic law system. This normative confusion
can explain the paradox of right-wing conservatives advocating the same as left-wing
progressives: disintegration through the nation-state. The civil society sees free trade
mainly as a (neoliberal) project to keep at bay the regulatory state, which is the only unit
to offer us protection. This can generally be said of the whole project of international
economic governance, ranging from the controversial World Bank conditionality to the
see NadiaRocha, Paolo Giordani and Michele Ruta, ‘Food Prices and the Multiplier Effect of Trade Policy’,
Journal of International Economics 101 (2016).
96 Elisabeth Zerofsky, The New Yorker, 9 April 2020.
97 See Critical Macro Finance, Open Letter: ‘Developing and Emerging Countries Need Capital Controls
to Prevent Financial Catastrophe’. https://criticalfinance.org/2020/03/24/developing-and-emerging-cou
ntries-need-capital-controls/ (visited 12 April 2020).
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by-now infamous investor state arbitration. The retreat to the nation-state can be better
understood from this vantage point.
Recent history, however, shows that it is the state itself that can choose market
fundamentalism as one of its core normative principles and act in the interest of the
few rather than the public at large. History has amply shown how the nation-state can
marginalize minorities, foster racism, and contribute to inequalities. The spectre of
Schmitt and the hypersovereign is with us. The nation, also called Patria/fatherland in
Italian (from Latin, pater, father, wherefrom the word patriotism) remains problematic
and it is hard to reduce our international political fantasy to this as the center of reforms
for the system of international economic governance. In the words of an old Italian
public intellectual: ‘If you have the right to divide the world in Italians and foreigners,
then I will say that I have no Fatherland/Nation as you mean it, and I claim my
right to divide the world in dispossessed and oppressed on the one hand, privileged
and oppressors on the other. The former are my Fatherland/Nation, the latter my
foreigners.’99 So while some proposals to endow the nation-state with more power are
pragmatically remarkable for what they could potentially achieve, it is the nation-state,
as their analytical/normative driver that remains troubling, with one caveat. The nation-
state continues to be a site of democracy and global institutions of economic governance
should come to terms with their relation and impact on democracy. In this respect,
further articulation of the ‘freedom from domination or anti-alienation principle’ could
help mediating this relation.
The other flaw in resorting to the nation-state, as the chief solution to our problems,
is that it fosters and normalizes the idea by which international economic law has no
responsibility for redistribution, social justice or the protection of the environment. It
is the task of international economic lawyers to bring these responsibilities back to the
center stage of the international law project. As Lang aptly put in the context of the
legitimacy crisis of the WTO:
‘this legitimacy crisis occurred not —or not just— because the WTO became over the
course of the 1980s and 1990s more powerful and “intrusive”, and developed a far broader
scope of application to “behind the border” regulatory barriers to trade. . . . It was . . . the
separation of the exercise of public power at the international level from the pursuit of
collective public purpose, and the exercise of collective moral responsibility . . . which
led to the WTO’s legitimacy crisis.’100
In the background of a dreadful efficiency dream, the film Sorry we missed you also
shows small acts of resistance: an old lady throwing a dish on the floor to ‘steal’ few more
minutes with her loving caregiver and the caregiver relentlessly carving out moments of
99 Translated by the author. The original text reads: ‘Se voi avete il diritto di dividere il mondo in italiani e
stranieri, allora io dirò che, nel vostro senso, io non ho Patria e reclamo il diritto di dividere il mondo in
diseredati e oppressi da un lato, privilegiati e oppressori dall’altro. Gli uni son la mia Patria, gli altri i miei
stranieri.’ Don Lorenzo Milani, esperienze pastorali (Pastoral Experiences), (Libreria Editrice Fiorentina,
1958).
100 Andrew Lang, World Trade Law after Neoliberalism: Reimagining the Global Economic Order (Oxford: Oxford
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humanity, otherwise proscribed by her efficient time-schedule. So is humanity resisting
the efficiency dream of the international economic order: from the rooms of the Centre
William Rappard in Geneva—where the right to health has (partly) won over IPRs—
to the mushrooming of climate change litigation, where people are mobilizing human
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